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Abstract 
In Japan very little empirical security research has been conducted using economic theory. This is because the utility 
maximization and profit maximization on which economic theory is based are considered to be difficult to apply to 
security research. The authors have created a model for utilizing economic theory, which so far has been difficult to 
apply to the economic analysis of security, which they call the MAI-I model. 
This model has the following features. 
First, when performing analysis using utility functions, it uses government utility functions and assumes the use of 
cardinal utility which can accurately measure utility levels. The utility function in this paper, therefore, makes it 
possible to accurately measure the utility level of past Cabinets with respect to defense. 
Second, in order to accurately measure utility the precision of utility functions must be increased. In economic theory, 
for the purpose of greater measurement convenience, utility functions are assumed to be 1st-order homogenous 
functions. This paper does not make that assumption. Instead, it assumes the function is a μ-order homogenous function 
and creates a model for use in cardinal utility measurement. The utility function includes μ in its power, but 
measurement was made possible by using it as an MAI-I model. 
This produced the following results. 
First, it was possible to measure the μ value of the μ-order homogenous function, necessary to measure the utility level 
of the Japanese government with regard to defense. It was found that the function was a 1.1079-order homogenous 
function. This indicated that the Japanese government has, for a long time, implemented security policy with a defense 
expenditure budget of less than 1% of the GDP, and restrained their utility even though it will largely grow if they will 
increase defense equipments and personnels. 
Second, this utility function could then be used to calculate the government's cardinal utility. This cardinal utility was 
said to be impossible to measure accurately, but assuming the function is a μ-order homogenous function, it was 
possible to utilize Japanese defense data to perform measurement. In other words, for the Cabinets which actually 
focused on security policy, the policies were reflected in actual utility level measurements, indicating that the MAI-I 
model created in this paper can be used for economic analysis of security. The ability to use the utility functions of this 
paper to accurately measure utility levels of past Cabinets with regard to defense is a successful quantification of 
Japan's defense history. 
Last, the paper indicated future potential for use of the model in analyzing utility from a variety of perspectives.  
Keywords: MAI-I model, Past Cabinets with regard to defense, defense expenditure, Estimating the CES-Utility 
Function, System-Wide Approach 
1. Introduction 
1.1 Overview and Objectives 
In Japan very little empirical security research has been conducted using economic theory. This is because the utility 
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maximization and profit maximization on which economic theory is based are considered to be difficult to apply to 
security research. Another reason is that in Japan security studies and economics have been handled as separate research 
fields. However, research which integrates the two approaches has been gradually developed in the West since the 
1960s under the name "defense economics." 
The objective of this paper is to use this new perspective of defense economics to connect the security studies and 
economics approaches. Specifically, in Japanese security policy it has been unclear what exactly utility means, and what 
profit means, so this paper will create a new Japanese defense indicator that serves as an indicator of utility. Until now 
Japanese defense indicators have consisted solely of overall figures, limited by simple base 10 restrictions, such as 
defense expenditures accounting for 1% or less of GDP. This figure, stating that defense expenditure accounts for 1% or 
less of GDP, has not effectively conveyed to the people the level of defense the government has wished to achieve. This 
paper will develop a method for calculating Japan's defense indicator, and define a new corresponding indicator. It will 
serve as a quantitative indicator of how eager the government has been regarding security policy by visualizing how 
much past Cabinets have focused on security policy. 
1.2 The MAI-I Model 
The economic model created in this paper is called the "MAI-I model." This model is notable, first, because it makes it 
possible to apply economic theory to verification and analysis, which has been difficult with actual economic analysis in 
the past. This model focuses on a perspective which combines security studies and economics approaches. Second, 
applying this model makes it possible not only to measure ordinal utility, but cardinal utility as well. Accurately 
measuring utility broadens the range of potential applications to various economic fields, and this model is notable for 
serving as a model of defense economics. Not only is utility used as existing data, but it can be quantitatively calculated 
with the MAI-I model. It has been difficult to quantify the mentality and psychology of people and organizations in the 
past, but this model makes it possible to accurately estimate them. This paper makes it possible to measure the 
eagerness of the government with respect to defense, which has not been possible in the security research field in the 
past, and visualizes this eagerness. This paper presents the optimal model for considering the level of government utility 
with regard to defense. 
1.3 Previous Research 
Sandler and Hartley (1995) wrote a paper whose objective was to "apply economic analysis tools to issues of defense, 
arms limitations, conversion of military related technology to civilian use, and peace" (introduction). The essential 
nature of defense economics is the use of tools such as economics theory and verification analysis to analyze security 
issues. It is focused on economic issues which are not normally handled in peace research, such as weapon expenditure 
trends, defense policy, and war (conflict), including military expansion and defense expenditures. 
Recent leading research looking at Japanese defense from the perspective of defense economics includes research by 
Ando (2015) which uses an autoregression distribution lag model (ADL model) to verify, from both short-term and 
long-term perspectives, whether U.S. defense contributes to Japanese defense. Ando's inferential results are that 
Japanese defense expenditures have maintained a stable relationship with estimated U.S.-side variables. That is, it does 
fulfil a role, and Japan did, within the estimated period, cooperate with the U.S. Ando performed econometric analysis 
of Japanese defense expenditures from a macroeconomics vantage, but did not go as far as indicating "utility" with 
regard to Japanese defense from a clear economic theory standpoint. 
Leading economic theory-based research includes that of Theil (1980a) (1980b). Measurement of cardinal utility 
requires the elimination of linear homogeneous assumptions from the utility function. However, it is not easy to 
empirically calculate the value of the elasticity of scale (μ) to substitute for linear homogeneity. Theil's system-wide 
approach theory made this possible. However, Theil did not realize this development potential, so this paper develops 
the potential of that characteristics to produce a new model. 
Mizuno (1998) applied Theil's system-wide approach theory, actually estimating a cardinal utility function for dietary 
meat, but did not go as far as extending its scope to a wider range of fields, such as the security research that is 
examined in this paper. This paper will serve as the first step in applying this theory to other research fields for which it 
has been difficult to apply economic theory in the past. 
2. The MAI-I Model  
2.1 Estimating the CES-Utility Function 
The MAI-I model assumes that utility is cardinal. Based on this, it creates a utility function for defense, and performs 
inference with this utility function. This section defines the CES-utility function. One of the features of the MAI-I 
model is that it does not define a 1st-order homogenous utility function, but a μ-order homogenous utility function. In 
other words, it can be used with general cases where the elasticity of scale is not 1. A 1st-order homogenous function 
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can only be used to perform formal ordinal utility calculation. A μ-order homogenous utility function can be used to 
perform cardinal utility calculation, which is considered capable of accurate calculation, such as when utility is 
gradually increasing or gradually decreasing. 
The following utility function is used to calculate utility. It is notable for including μ within the power. A μ-order 
homogenous function is used for the utility function to make it possible to measure cardinal utility so that psychological 
degree can be calculated accurately. 
𝑢 = (𝛼1𝑞1
−𝛽 + 𝛼2𝑞2
−𝛽) −
𝜇
𝛽                               (1) 
q 1: Defense equipment 
      In actuality, determined from national defense budget and the costs of personnel and provisions 
q 2: Total actual number of self-defense force officials 
p1: Cost of defense equipment 
government bond yield 
Reason: Actual government funds are paid for by the issuing of government bonds 
p2: Costs of personnel and provisions per person 
We do not assume α１+α２=1, and α１<1,α２<1. 
Here, u is interpreted as follows. The leading element in the utility function is the government. In other words, with 
regard to defense the government consumes defense equipment and personnel. The utility derived here does not refer to 
citizens’ utility but government utility. The utility level determined with these calculations indicates the utility of the 
government with respect to defense. 
      u: Utility of the government with respect to defense 
2.2 Procedure for Estimating the CES-Utility Function 
The first step in estimating the CES-utility function is estimating the following demand function. The figures needed to 
derive the estimated values for each CES-utility function parameter function can be calculated. The following formula 
can be used to calculate values other than μ for the μ-order homogenous function. 
 
            
𝒑𝟐
𝒑𝟏
= 𝒂(
𝒒𝟐
𝒒𝟏
)𝒃                                          (2) 
Data and estimation period: 1986 to 2013 
This demand function estimates by converting Formula (2) into a log function. 
ln
𝑝2
𝑝1
= lna + bln
𝑞2
𝑞1
                                        (3) 
The estimation results of Formula (2)' are as follows. 
 
          ln
𝑝2
𝑝1
= 0.1105 + 0.1090ln
𝑞2
𝑞1
  -(2)'' 
(14.3688)  (3.7405) 
R
2＝0.3498 
Formula (2)" produces persuasive estimation results, although the coefficient of determination is not high. Looking at 
the t value in parentheses, the level of significance for each variable is 1%, indicating that each result is also persuasive. 
Parameters a and b for Formula (2) can therefore both be determined. Using these values to perform calculations while 
indicating the correspondence relationships for each CES-utility function parameter produces the following results. 
 
a = 1.1168 
b = 0.1090 
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𝛼1 = 1/(𝑏 + 1) = 0.9017 
𝛼2 = 𝑎/(𝑏 + 1) = 1.0070 
β = −(b + 1) = −1.1090                                 (3) 
Estimate values for the majority of the parameters in Formula (1) have now been determined. 
2.3 System-Wide Approach Estimation (=Estimation of Elasticity of Scale) 
The only missing parameter required for calculation using Formula (1), parameter μ (elasticity of scale, μ-order 
homogenous function) is determined using the system-wide approach theory described in Theil (1980a) (1980b). The 
theoretical demand formula is expressed as a differential demand equation relative price formula. 
w1dlnq1 = θ1dlnQ + ϕθ11dln
p1
pF
+ ϕθ12dln
p2
pF
 
w2dlnq2 = θ2dlnQ + ϕθ21dln
p1
pF
+ ϕθ22dln
p2
pF
                             (4) 
In Formula (4) dlnpF=θ1 dlnp1+θ2 dlnp2 is the Frish price index and dlnQ is the Divisia quantity index, expressed as 
dlnQ=w1 dlnq1+w2 dlnq2.Φ represents income elasticity. Here, wi (i=1,2) represents the budget share (the percentage 
share of each good of the total budget) and θij (i=1,2, j=1,2) represents the limit share (the ratio of increase of the 
percentage share of each good when the budget increases). Limitations include the fact that, as shown below, these 
values must add up to 1. 
w1 + w2 = 1 
θ1 + θ2 = 1 
With regard to budget share, each item must be greater than 0 and smaller than 1, but when interest is used as a value, 
given past negative interest rates, this limitation may not always apply (Note 2). The limit share does not have the same 
limitation as the budget share, requiring each value to be greater than 0 and less than 1, so negative values may also 
exist. 
Actual estimation is performed using the following absolute price form. This has the same value as the relative price. 
w1dlnq1 = θ1dlnQ + π11dlnp1 + π12dlnp2 
⟺   w1dlnq1 = θ1dlnQ + π11(dlnp1 − dlnp2)                        (5) 
Here, the following limitation applies to π11 and π12 in Formula (5). 
 
π11 + π12 = 0 
π21 + π22 = 0 
π12 = π21                                          (6) 
Due to this limitation, there is no need to use the equation to perform estimation for two goods, and all included 
parameters can be calculated based on this limitation. 
The following formulas also hold. 
 
π11 = 𝜙(𝜃11 − 𝜃1
2) 
π12 = 𝜙(𝜃12 − 𝜃1𝜃2) 
π21 = 𝜙(𝜃21 − 𝜃2𝜃1) 
π22 = 𝜙(𝜃22 − 𝜃2
2)                                     (7) 
Given the limitations that apply to Formulas (6) and (7), as with Theil (1980b), assuming a standard distribution of error 
values, Formula (5) is estimated using OLS (Note 3). 
The estimation results of Formula (5) are as follows. The estimation period is 1986 to 2013(Note 4). 
w1dlnq1 = 0.2478dlnQ − 0.0923(dlnp1 − dlnp2) 
                    (2.8213)   (-1.9206) 
𝑅2 = 0.5189 
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𝜃1 = 0.2478 
π11 = −0.0923 
Calculating each parameter, using the above limitations and an income elasticity value of ϕ=-0.5 produces Table 1 
below (Note 5). 
Table 1. System-Wide Approach Parameter Estimated Values 
𝜃2 = 1 − 𝜃1 = 0.7522 
π11 －0.0923 𝜃11 0.2460 
π12 0.0923 𝜃12 0.0018 
π21 0.0923 𝜃21 0.0018 
π22 －0.0923 𝜃22 0.7504 
 
From Table 1 it is possible to determine elasticity of scale μ, which corresponds to n for the n-th order 
homogeneous CES-utility function. 
μ = (β + 1)
𝜃12
𝜃1𝜃2
− 𝛽 = 1.1079 
The value of the elasticity of scale, μ, was 1.1079. In other words, this shows that Japan's defense utility can be 
expressed as a 1.1079-order homogenous function. The utility in this paper refers to government utility, so this indicates 
that the Japanese government has, for a long time, implemented security policy with a defense expenditure budget of 
less than 1% of the GDP, and restrained their utility even though it will largely grow if they will increase defense 
equipments and personnels (Note 6). 
3. Visualization of a New Indicator  
3.1 Calculation of Cardinal Utility 
The government's past cardinal utility with regard to defense was calculated by substituting the data used for estimation 
into the CES-utility function. The growth rate was also calculated (Note 7). Figure 1 shows the government's cardinal 
utility with regard to defense, and Figure 2 shows the growth rate. Looking at Figure 1, the government's cardinal utility 
with regard to defense rose until 2003, fell slightly from 2004 to 2009, and rose thereafter. Figure 2 shows that the 
growth rate has repeatedly risen and fallen, with its peak in 1987. In recent years it has risen from 2011 to 2013. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
.  
 
Figure 1. Government's Cardinal Utility with Regard to Defense 
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Figure 2. Growth Rate of Government's Cardinal Utility with Regard to Defense 
3.2 Analysis Based on Calculation Results 
The calculation results for the government's cardinal utility with regard to defense indicated in Figures 1 and 2 can be 
used to analyze the attitude towards defense of past Cabinets. 
Tables 2a and 2b show changes in Cabinet attitudes during the late 1980s, 1990s, and 2000s. Figures 1 and 2 show the 
results of numerical analysis of attitudes towards defense each year (Note 8). Many of Japan's prime ministers have 
been called soft-liners, but Tables 2a and 2b show the Cabinets which exhibited a high degree of eagerness with regard 
to defense, and the backgrounds behind them. 
First, looking at Table 2a, the third Nakasone Cabinet had a high utility growth rate. Yasuhiro Nakasone became prime 
minister in 1982. He was known as a hard-liner polemicist, and showed right wing tendencies within the LDP from an 
early age. When he became prime minister the economy was in the midst of a bubble, and he was very close to U.S. 
President Ronald Reagan. Needless to say, given the defense requests from the U.S. as well, the Nakasone Cabinet 
implemented defense strengthening policies. The decision made by the Takeo Miki Cabinet in 1976 to restrict defense 
expenditures to 1% or less of the GNP was revoked in December 1986. Defense expenditures exceeded 1% of the GNP 
for three successive years starting in 1987. The high rate of utility level growth can be considered a reflection of the 
mentality of the Nakasone Cabinet. 
Table 2a. Analysis of Attitude toward Defense by Past Cabinets (1986 – 1999) 
Year 
Cabinet Changes Cardinal 
Utility 
Utility Growth 
Rate 
1986 (Third term) Yasuhiro Nakasone 106225 ----- 
1987 (Third term) Nakasone -> Noboru Takeshita 111543 0.0501  
1988 Takeshita -> Sosuke Uno 115727.2 0.0375  
1989 Uno -> (First cabinet) Toshiki Kaifu 117250.7 0.0132  
1990 (First cabinet) Kaifu -> (Second term) Kaifu 118145 0.0076  
1991 (Second term) Kaifu -> Kiichi Miyazawa 119524.6 0.0117  
1992 Miyazawa 121472.2 0.0163  
1993 Miyazawa -> Morihiro Hosokawa 123264.1 0.0148  
1994 
Hosokawa -> Tsutomu Hata -> Tomiichi 
Murayama 
124999.3 0.0141  
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1995 Murayama 126322.2 0.0106  
1996 Murayama -> (First cabinet) Ryutaro Hashimoto 128188.5 0.0148  
1997  (Second term) Hashimoto 129394.7 0.0094  
1998  (Second term) Hashimoto -> Keizo Obuchi 130106.2 0.0055  
1999 Obuchi 132322 0.0170  
Next, looking that the attitudes towards defense by Cabinets in the 2000s, shown in Table 2b, shows that utility rose 
from 2001 to 2003, when Koizumi was in office. In 2001 the Junichiro Koizumi Cabinet was formed. With the 
exception of the immediately preceding Mori Cabinet there were no cabinets from the 1970s onwards since the 
Nakasone Cabinet which focused on defense. The three laws related to emergency legislation – the Armed Attack 
Situations Response Act, which permitted the dispatching of the Japan self-defense forces overseas, the Amendment to 
the Self-Defense Forces Law, and the Amendment to the Act for Establishment of the Security Council of Japan -- were 
passed in 2003. This stance was reflected in the utility levels, and utility growth rose from 2001 to 2002. 
This table also shows that utility rose for the second term Abe Cabinet from 2012 onwards. The second term Abe 
Shinzo Cabinet was created in December 2012. This Cabinet showed a focus on defense, passing the Bill for the 
Development of Legislation for Peace and Security in 2015. This Cabinet stance is reflected in the utility level growth 
rate in 2013 reaching roughly 1%, a high growth rate. This shows the Cabinet's eagerness with regard to defense. 
Table 2b. Analysis of Attitude toward Defense by Past Cabinets (2000 -2013) 
Year 
Cabinet Changes Cardinal 
Utility 
Utility Growth 
Rate 
2000 
Obuchi -> (First cabinet) Yoshiro Mori -> 
(Second cabinet) Mori 
132886.3 0.0043  
2001 
(Second cabinet) Mori -> (First cabinet) 
Junichiro Koizumi 
134150.7 0.0095  
2002 (First cabinet) Koizumi 136802.9 0.0198  
2003 
(First cabinet) Koizumi -> (Second cabinet) 
Koizumi 
138352.9 0.0113  
2004 (Second cabinet) Koizumi 137468.4 -0.0064  
2005 
(Second cabinet) Koizumi -> (Third cabinet) 
Koizumi 
135903.4 -0.0114  
2006 
(Third cabinet) Koizumi -> (First cabinet) 
Shinzo Abe 
136013.6 0.0008  
2007 
(First cabinet) Abe -> (First cabinet) Yasuo 
Fukuda 
135359.1 -0.0048  
2008 Fukuda -> Taro Aso 134176.2 -0.0087  
2009 Aso -> Yukio Hatoyama 134757.1 0.0043  
2010 Hatoyama -> Naoto Kan 135008.4 0.0019  
2011 Kan -> Yoshihiko Noda 134412.6 -0.0044  
2012 Noda -> (Second cabinet) Abe 134975.8 0.0042  
2013 (Second cabinet) Abe 136313 0.0099  
 
4. Conclusion 
This paper considered utility as an indicator of Japanese security policy, and defined a new Japanese defense indicator. 
This new indicator was used to quantify the attitude of past Cabinets towards defense, and to visualize how much past 
Cabinets focused on security policy. 
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First, when performing analysis using the utility function, in order to measure cardinal utility, which is considered 
capable of being used to accurately calculate attitudes, the government utility function was assumed to be a μ-th order 
homogenous function, and a measurement model was created. The utility function includes μ in its power, but 
measurement was made possible by using it as an MAI-I model. The results of the measurement indicated that the 
government utility function was roughly a 1.1079-order homogenous function. 
Second, the calculation results for the government's cardinal utility with regard to defense indicated in Figures 1 and 2 
were used to analyze the attitude towards defense of past Cabinets. The analysis results showed that defense utility 
levels were high for the Nakasone Cabinet, the Koizumi Cabinet, and the second Abe Cabinet, said to be focused on 
defense. In other words, for the Cabinets which actually focused on security policy, the policies were reflected in actual 
utility level measurements, indicating that the MAI-I model created in this paper can be used for economic analysis of 
security. The ability to use the utility functions of this paper to accurately measure utility levels of past Cabinets with 
regard to defense is a successful quantification of Japan's defense history. 
However, this paper is just the first step in the creation of the MAI-I model. One of the key features of the MAI-I model 
is that it produces cardinal utility calculation results with great potential for other applications. Indifference curve 
analysis, residual analysis, etc., can be used to provide defense-related policy recommendations. These will be areas for 
future research. 
Appendix 
Data sources and processing methods (in form of annual data) 
Defense equipment: 
Calculated as "national defense budget - cost of personnel and provisions" 
Source: Defense Yearbook 
National defense budget (100 million yen) 
Cost of personnel and provisions (100 million yen) 
Labor: Actual number of self-defense force officials 
Source: Defense Yearbook 
Price: 
Defense equipment: (1+ New 10 year government bond distribution yield) 
Source: Ministry of Finance website Interest information – Year-end figures for 1974 to 1990 9 year government bonds 
for 1985 onwards 
Self-defense official: 
Cost of personnel and provisions (100 million yen) 
Source: Defense Yearbook 
Costs of defense equipment and of personnel and provisions was actualized using the government final consumption 
calculation deflator (2005 prices). The government final consumption calculation deflator was based on Cabinet Office 
national economic accounting. 
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Notes 
Note 1. This work was supported by JSPS KAKENHI Grant Number 15K13024. Any remaining errors are the author’s 
responsibility. 
Note 2. There was no negative inflation at the time of the Theil (1980a) (1980b) research, so budget share was seen as 0 
or greater and 1 or less. 
Note 3. The maximum-likelihood method was applied to estimates, but assuming error follows standard deviation, 
estimates were determined by applying OLS. 
Note 4. See appendix regarding data. 
Note 5. Income growth of -0.5 was used for estimates for Theil (1980a) (1980b) and Mizuno (1998).  
Note 6. As indicated later, the 1% of GNP limitation on defense expenditures was revoked, but defense expenditures 
remain at roughly 1% of the GNP. 
Note 7. Utility growth calculation was performed by substituting defense equipment and cost of personnel and 
provisions for each year.  
Note 8. The list of past cabinets on the website of the Prime Minister of Japan and His Cabinet website was used for the 
terms of office of past Cabinets. http://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/rekidainaikaku/ 
Note 9. Utility growth calculation was performed by substituting defense equipment and cost of personnel and 
provisions for each year. 
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